McGhie Genealogy Website

NORTH TO THE SOLOMONS
Three separate convoys carried the 3rd Division to Guadalcanal, where an advanced base known as the Forward Maintenance Centre or FMC in military language, was established for operations during the whole of the Solomons Campaign. The 14th Brigade arrived first, disembarking there on 27 August 1943. Divisional troops and units followed on 2 September and the 8th Brigade on 14 September. As the first units of the Division settled into new camps for a brief period before moving north into action in the jungle, Italy’s surrender came as welcome news from the European front.
The voyage from the Hebrides, into increasing heat as each day brought the Equator nearer, was without incident, though the second convoy, which included two transports carrying Divisional troops, was attacked by submarine. Early one morning three torpedoes were reported by lookout personnel to have passed harmlessly through the six transports and five destroyers just as the ships steamed into the sheltered waters dividing the southern islands of the group. No one saw the submarine. At that time enemy underwater craft lay in wait for shipping which passed between Guadalcanal and Cristobal, the lane most frequently used by all convoys approaching from the south, but superior air cover and the increasing strength of protective naval craft were rapidly diminishing the attacks as the Japanese were relentlessly driven farther north.
When units of the 3rd Division landed on Guadalcanal, that island was the principal forward base for actions in progress 32Okms away to the north in the New Georgia Group. The sheltered waters near Tulagi, a tiny island off the coast of Florida and formerly the Government station and principal trading centre, had been organised as a naval base and there ships sheltered behind many miles of strong submarine nets. Henderson Field, the first aerodrome on Guadalcanal to be wrested from the Japanese, was restless and noisy with the continual arrival and departure of hundreds of planes fighters and bombers going to and from raiding tasks; reconnaissance planes constantly watching immediate sea lanes for submarines or investigating enemy activity on other islands; Scat machines ferrying cargoes of men and material to combat zones and forward areas or returning with sick and wounded. By that time, too, other airfields had been constructed and were in operation. Only a particularly large flight of aircraft caused the men to cease work and look into a brilliant blue sky, so familiar had the overhead drone become to their ears.
By the time the Division arrived to play its part in the Solomons Campaign the strategy of bypassing enemy occupied islands had been devised and was being fulfilled. In order to achieve success this strategy required the use of large numbers of aircraft to provide air cover, patrols and to pulverise enemy bases and aerodromes; motor torpedo boats to work at night attacking enemy barges transporting personnel and supplies to their various island garrisons; landing craft of all sizes to ferry our own troops and equipment for each engagement and naval vessels to protect convoys of smaller craft and, if necessary, to bombard enemy positions at the point of attack. These were then all available for Admiral W.F.Halsey’s forces, of which 3rd NZ Division was a valuable striking unit.
Briefly the strategy of bypassing was to get behind the enemy, isolate his bases, and force him to evacuate or surrender by cutting his supply lines and smashing his airfields and defences. This was achieved by capturing some island ahead of an enemy base and establishing there with the greatest possible speed airfields (or airstrips as they were more popularly known), naval bases, and supply dumps. Thus established air power from the new base supported the next move forward and enabled a continuous assault to be maintained on the enemy. Flotillas of motor torpedo boats, hidden during the day, prowled the sea lanes at night so that supplies could not reach the beleaguered enemy garrisons.
These powerful little craft, which were practically all engines and armament encased in a wooden shell, traveled at impressive speed and played a significant role in the struggle for the Solomons. The capture of Vella Lavella was a sound example of bypassing strategy and one of the first. It forced the Japanese to evacuate Kolombangara and several smaller islands north of New Georgia and paved the way for the next forward thrusts to the Treasuries, Empress Augusta Bay, and ultimately Green Islands. Amphibious warfare also required the closest cooperation between all three services so that any engagement, if it was to achieve the desired success, had to be planned by representatives of Army, Navy and Air Force working as one organisation.
Units of the Division were on their toes as the hot days went by. Action was not long delayed, but the Division seemed fated to dispersion. Never once during the Solomons Campaign did the two brigades work together in one concerted action. By the time the 8th Brigade was disembarking on Guadalcanal the 14th Brigade was embarking for its move forward. From then the two brigades fought on separate islands, one always a hop, and a long hop, ahead of the other, so that their only direct links were by wireless and aircraft. There can be no connected story of their activities for the brigades did not join up again until they returned to New Caledonia the following year.
The Division’s first task, that of clearing Vella Lavella, fell to the 14th Brigade. When units disembarked on Guadalcanal on 16 August 1943 two American divisions were still engaged in eradicating the last of the Japanese from Arundel Island and the north coast of New Georgia. Munda airfield was operating and fighter planes based there supplemented those from Guadalcanal which daily pounded the enemy strongholds in the north, but the Munda field was still subject to night attacks which were frequent and often very destructive. Units from one of the divisions based on New Georgia had been in action on Vella Lavella for some time and had succeeded in driving the Japanese garrison into the north of the island where they were holding an area in Paraso Bay on the northeast coast, and Mundi Mundi on the west coast. In the south of the island American engineer construction units, known as CBs, had already begun the expeditious removal of a large area of jungle for an airfield at Barakoma, beside the beach of that name, and a naval base had been established close by at Biloa, a former mission station of which only some concrete foundations and flowering trees remained. A rough jeep track ran through the cocoanut palms and jungle for some miles to the north, following the coast. Harassing raids were a nightly occurrence as the Japanese tried to hinder work on the airfield and destroy torpedo boats and petrol dumps.
Major-General Barrowclough decided to establish his Advanced Divisional Headquarters on Vella Lavella, bringing up the remainder of his Headquarters at a later date.   He went north on 17 August, traveling by air from Guadalcanal to Munda and completing the journey that night by motor torpedo boat from Rendova, then a strong and important base for these valuable craft.    Islands still held by the enemy were skirted on the way up, and a brilliant fireworks display in the darkness revealed an enemy attack on Munda far away on the right.
[ Top ]

Vella Lavella Invasion

Approximately 3,700 troops of the Division made the first landing on Vella Lavella.   They traveled north in a convoy consisting of six LSTs, six APDs, and six LCIs, escorted by five destroyers, and carrying with them large supplies of ammunition, petrol, equipment, stores and transport.
At dawn on 18 September, after two uneventful days at sea during which the men exercised their parliamentary vote, the landing craft lay off the beaches, with Japanese held Kolombangara, looking rather like a larger and bluer edition of Rangitoto, behind them across the narrow channel.   High overhead an umbrella of fighters, many of them flown by New Zealand airmen, buzzed comfortingly in the clear morning sunshine as the craft came in and disembarkation began at selected beaches where officers who had gone ahead a few days previously awaited their units to act as guides to bivouac areas.
Men and supplies poured from the landing craft.   As the ramps of the LST's came clattering down vehicles rolled out and bumped into the enveloping jungle and mud, for the narrow track skirting the beaches was feet deep in slush.    If a ramp fell into water or at a site which vehicles could not negotiate, a lumbering bulldozer made a noisy exit.   Palms shuddered, swayed, and finally crashed before the force of these powerful machines as their shining blades scooped and pushed earth and coral and all that grew thereon to form a runway between beach and ramp.   Meanwhile long chains of men, often waist deep in water, passed boxes of supplies and equipment from ship to shore, clearing the landing craft as quickly as possible.    They knew that Japanese planes might arrive at any moment for the whole operation could be observed from enemy lookouts on Kolombangara, only l7kms across the water, and and landing craft were too valuable to be wasted.    Soon after midday the attack came, but by that time disembarkation was completed.   Landing craft lay far out in the channel, herded by destroyers in preparation for the return journey to Guadalcanal to load another cargo of personnel and equipment.     Men and supplies had been swallowed up by the jungle, and the few whose duty kept them guarding dumps disappeared with incredible speed. High in the blue planes zoomed and droned, their machine guns spitting viciously.    It seemed as if that sky were made of cloth which was being violently torn to shreds by giant invisible hands. Anti-aircraft guns joined in, barking all along the beaches from behind revetments of cocoanut logs. Like many such attacks it ended quickly, but not before seven Japanese planes were destroyed, most of them falling into the sea.   Fragments of anti-aircraft shells came down like swarms of angry bees, zipping through the leaves
General Barrowclough took over command of the island and its defences on 18 September and became, in American military language, Commanding General Northern Landing Force or, more briefly, CGNLF, such abbreviation being necessary to save time and space on signals
Between 500 and 700 Japanese, mostly naval personnel of good physique, were being held by American troops, supported by Fijian scouts along the northern area of the island where the coast was deeply indented and mangrove swamps added to transport and communication difficulties.    The main enemy force had its headquarters at Timbala Bay, where a radio station and lookout had been established, with smaller groups holding scattered posts along the coast on both flanks; The Brigades task was to relieve the Americans and clear the island as quickly as possible
Brigadier Potter's plan of operation entailed the use of two combat teams, the 35th Battalion on the left flank, and the 37th Battalion on the right. The 30th Battalion was held in the rear as a reserve.    Each combat team had its engineers from the 20th Field Company, medical units from the 22nd Field Ambulance, and supply personnel from the 16th MT Company, with artillery working in support
The method of attack was to employ a pincer movement, bringing each battalion in from a flank and ultimately trapping the Japanese garrison when the two battalions effected a meeting. By 21 September beach-heads had been established by the 35th Battalion at Mundi Mundi River on the north-east coast, and by the 37th Battalion at Paraso Bay on the north coast
Brigadier Potter established an advanced headquarters at Matu Soroto for the duration of the engagement.   American units withdrew as the New Zealanders took over, and with them went the Fijian scouts.    Then, from their beach-heads, units moved in bounds round the coast in small landing craft, so many of which had been detailed from a boat pool for the use of each combat team.    Patrols crept through the jungle and swamps along the coasts, paving the way for the main advance of each battalion as the enemy was driven back on his main base
Conditions were harsh and difficult.   Rain fell, drenching the men and soaking their equipment and stores and turning the jungle into a bog.    Progress was slow, amounting to only 300 to 600 metres a. day during contact with the enemy, and a company front was rarely more than 100 metres wide.   The men moved along narrow tracks in single file, hindered by tree roots and clutching vines and always on the alert against ambush or enemy traps.   The construction of roads was impossible and would have taken months of work with bulldozers.   Every noise was suspect, for the Japanese, hidden among the roots of trees and up the trees themselves, held his fire until patrols came within five or ten metres.    The New Zealanders learnt to take the enemy seriously and with extreme caution.   At night perimeters were formed and not a man moved beyond the spot where he lay and secured himself as darkness fell.    Eyes and ears strained in an inky darkness made more fantastic by night noises such as crabs scuttling over coral and roots and the patter of rain among the leaves.   Every metre of ground had to be searched thoroughly, and when it was declared clear by the patrols, other troops followed around the coast in landing craft, establishing bases at sites dictated by openings in the reefs for the next probe forward.
By 25 September the pincer movement was progressing favourably though slowly, for in the jungle the advantage was always with the defenders, and weather conditions could not have been worse. Loyal native guides, one of whom was named 'Bamboo', warily moved with the New Zealand patrols.   Without them many more lives would have been lost and progress would have been even slower.   Those natives had an acute sense of smell and seemed to possess the ability to sniff out the Japanese, who left a curious odour behind him.    'No go there - Jap' , they often said, tapping a squat nose with a finger.    Bivouac areas were frequently raided by night, one of the worst attacks came on 25 September, when twenty Zeros and twenty dive bombers plastered advanced Headquarters at Matu Soroto, killing five men and wounding fifteen.   The Japanese garrison was running short of supplies and often their planes dropped food by parachute, some of which fell in the battalion areas and was gladly retrieved by the New Zealanders.
A day to day account of this slow, searching progress simply became a repetition of jungle-suited men, bearded and muddy, inching forward among trees and vines, squelching through mud and mangrove swamps, their eyes tired and strained by gazing into the mottled wall of greens and browns and occasional blobs of sunlight which confronted them, their nerves sharpened and taut to the. noise of every snapping twig.   Occasionally bursts of machine-gun fire from cunningly concealed nests among the the splaying roots or the crack of a sniper's rifle revealed the enemy, for only noises disclosed his position.   Then a sharp engagement followed as a nest of Japanese was eradicated before the patrols moved on.
If hand grenades were used they could be thrown only with the greatest care, for they frequently bounced back from vine and branch. Torrential rain hampered all movement and made observation difficult adding to the trials of the artillery, a battery of which covered the advance of each battalion.   Food supplies could be transported only by men slithering and sliding along the sodden tracks from dumps established on the beaches.   A shortage of small landing craft added to the difficulties of the advance, several of the boats having been lost on the reefs.
By 27 September a patrol of the 37th Battalion had reached Tambama and, by a clever rnanoeuvre, captured a large and well armed enemy barge hidden in a lagoon.   One section of the patrol surrounded a party of fourteen Japanese members of the crew and annihilated them. The booty included considerable quantities of rations and much valuable enemy equipment and charts.   Unfortunately souvenir hunters made excessive inroads into this material before it reached headquarters for examination by American born Japanese interpreters who were always attached to a Division in action, but the battalion named the barge 'CONFIDENT' and used it for the transport of supplies.    That same day, also, began a detached action which was typical of the whole enterprise in heroism and self sacrifice.    On the left flank the 35th Battalion had stubbornly found its way forward to Marquana Bay and was closing in on the main Japanese position, to which enemy patrols had retreated. A strong patrol consisting of a platoon commanded by Lieutenant J.W. Beaumont and another commanded by Lieutenant J.S.Albon was ordered to cover a track running up a ridge behind Marquana Bay and thus prevent an enemy escape into the interior when the final assault was made on the garrison
Some idea of the density of the jungle may be imagined by the fact that those men had to watch over a hundred Japanese pass within six feet of them along the track.   The party was divided at the time and it was thought unwise to attack as the New Zealanders were on either side of the track.   Later, when they tried to rejoin their battalion, the Japanese had surrounded them and escape was impossible.    By this time both platoons had joined up. They formed a small perimeter to meet the enemy as he came into attack with hand grenades, rifles, and machine guns.   Scurrying from tree to tree the Japanese yelled and shouted, sometimes in English, as they hurled their grenades.   A burst of machine gun fire put the ambushed party's wireless set out of action and wounded the signaler, who was trying to get a message through to headquarters.
The New Zealanders held their fire, shooting only when a target revealed itself among the leaves, for they were hopelessly outnumbered. Rations were short, as much equipment and all food and water had been discarded by Lieutenant Albon's men when they crossed the track to join the other platoon to meet and repulse the original attack.   By nightfall the enemy had been beaten off and their officer killed. He screamed the loudest and was easily identified.   Then, tired, wet, and hungry this little garrison prepared for its night ordeal. What little food remained was divided among the men and rain water was trapped in the men's capes
Next day the Japanese attacked again and again, but the weary garrison drove them back each time.   They held them off for nearly a week under that eerie jungle canopy.   By 30 September the men were showing signs of weakness, but only because they were short of food and water, morale was still high.   That day Lieutenant Albon and two men escaped through the encircling Japanese and went for help. Lieutenant Beaumont remained with the men.   A small party tried to retrieve the discarded rations and water, but without success. The following day Lieutenant Beaumont decided that they must make their way to the beach, l000 metres away, for the men in that tiny perimeter, which measured 20 metres by 30 metres, were growing too weak to last much longer and the wounded were suffering from privation and exposure.
Not a man complained.    They buried their dead and made stretchers for the six wounded men from vines and branches.    Private R.J. Fitzgerald, who had done excellent work and kept up morale, was himself wounded, but he lead the injured men while Lieutenant Beaumont and others covered their escape.   Fifty one of those men reached the beach on 1 October and formed a perimeter there until they were rescued the following night.   While they waited on the beach Private C.T.J. Beckham sought out and destroyed a Japanese machine-gun with grenades.
Great courage was displayed by those who went to the rescue of Lieutenant Beaumont and his men.   A barge carrying Lieutenant M.M.Ormsby, Second-Lieutenant C.D.Griffiths, and others of the reconnaissance party from battalion headquarters picked up signals from the weary men waving from the shore, so they gently moved their craft in until it grounded on the coral.   All was quiet and rescue seemed at hand.   Lieutenant Ormsby and Sergeant W.Q.McGhie slipped into the water and began to swim ashore with a line.   A burst of machine gun fire stuttered from the leafy barrier facing them.   Lieutenant Ormsby was killed, but the sergeant reached the shore and three men were hauled with difficulty back to the barge.
Their reports that the wounded men in the jungle were seriously in need of attention prompted the remainder to try to effect an immediate rescue, despite the fact that enemy eyes watched every movement.   In the meantime another barge arrived, with Lieutenant D.G.Graham in charge.   Between them they had nine machine-guns and artillery was now covering Lieutenant Beaumont's perimeter.   Using lifebelts as floats but hindered by jagged under-water coral the party courageously tried to get another line ashore.   Halfway between barge and beach bursts of machine-gun fire sadly thinned the ranks of the rescuers.   Lieutenant Griffiths, WO R.A.Roche, Privates S.Hislop and W.M.Pratt were killed, and later Private Fitzgerald, who had survived the agony of those days in the jungle, fell to a sniper's bullet.   Immediate rescue was impossible.   The attempt was abandoned until nightfall, when the remainder of the men on the beach were taken off in a rubber boat and a native canoe, an undertaking which occupied three and a half hours.
During the whole action these men had killed forty Japanese and wounded many more.   They themselves had lost six killed and eight wounded, but none of the injured had been abandoned.   Fortunately food dropped by an enemy parachute fell inside the New Zealand perimeter on the beach.   It was good and nourishing and consisted of fish, fruit, and cereals.   Water had been obtained from holes scooped in the mud and from waterproof capes.   In spite of their great thirst, for fear and privation dried their mouths, those men only sipped that precious liquid, saving most of it for the wounded.   Such was the spirit which existed throughout that grim week.   It was that spirit, also, which was exemplified by Padre G.C.Faloon, who helped to bring in their fallen comrades from the reef.
Meanwhile the two battalions were closing the gap between them, the 37th Battalion moving more quickly than the 35th.   During the occupation of Warambari Bay, Lieutenant D.M.Shirley, of the 37th Battalion, had a difficult time clearing out a nest of snipers and machine guns, between two of which part of his patrol was pinned down.   It was here, too, that Private A.McCullough, although wounded in both hands and one leg, acted swiftly to save his own and other lives when he picked up a Japanese grenade and threw it back into an enemy patrol before it had time to explode. The following day Lieutenant O.Nicholls was killed by a sniper while leading a patrol.   Corporal N.L.Dunlea, who was a fine example to his men, went out with Private Barbour and brought in the body.   That was only one of the many acts of bravery, not the least of which was Private R.Armour's exploit in swimming out to sea round the enemy's flank during operations by the 35th Battalion at Timbala Bay and delivering important messages to his headquarters.   Six American airmen whose aircraft had crashed some time previously were rescued at Tambama Bay on 7 October.
By 5 October the enemy garrison had been forced back into an area between Warambari and Marguana Bays and was under fire from two batteries of 17th Field Regiment as well as New Zealand machine gun and mortars.   Torrential rain fell and enemy aircraft kept up a constant patrol over the area so that the New Zealand guns were unable to maintain a prolonged bombardment.   The following night, while the two battalions were preparing for a final assault, the encircled Japanese numbering about 500 were evacuated by barge to destroyers which were waiting off the north of the island. But the enemy did not escape successfully.   The distant thunder of gunfire at sea could be heard by the men waiting in the sodden jungle.   They did not know until later that three American destroyers attacked the Japanese convoy and sunk many of the barges which had evacuated the men from Vella Lavella.   Seventy seven of the enemy were fished out of the sea the following day. Those destroyers had been guarding a convoy bringing troops and supplies from Guadalcanal and were detached for the engagement, leaving the convoy to shelter at Munda.   By 9 October, when patrols from the two battalions met at l0.33am and made a final reconnaissance of the area, all Japanese. resistance was considered at an end   Except for diminishing night bombing and strafing of the beaches.

You may want to consider buying a full copy of Ray Munoro's (self published) book with the maps and illustrations included. The books are published-to-order only and are available for $20 NZD at:

Ray Monoro
76b Martin Street
Upper Hutt
NEW ZEALAND

[ Top ]

Source: Warwick Hughes - "3rd NZ Division in the Pacific".